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Abstract 
Given the increasing frequency and severity of cyber 
attacks on information systems of all kinds, there is in-
terest in rationalized approaches for selecting the 
“best” set of cybersecurity mitigations. However, 
what is best for one target environment is not neces-
sarily best for another. This paper examines an ap-
proach to selection that uses a set of weighted criteria, 
where the security engineer sets the weights based on 
organizational priorities and constraints. The ap-
proach is based on a capability-based representation 
for cybersecurity mitigations. The paper discusses a 
group of artifacts that compose the approach through 
the lens of Design Science research and reports per-
formance results of an instantiation artifact. 
1. Introduction 
Cyber systems are ubiquitous across society. Breaches 
to cyber systems continue to be front-page news [1], 
and, despite more than a decade of heightened focus 
on cybersecurity, cyber threats continue to evolve and 
grow [2]–[4]. When threats are insufficiently or incor-
rectly mitigated based on the anticipated threat, expo-
sure remains. Conversely, over-protection wastes re-
sources and can affect system performance; hence, in-
discriminate application of mitigations is ill-advised.  
A key method for prioritizing mitigations is to assess 
the business/mission risks that an organization faces 
due to the anticipated cyber threat. A number of risk 
assessment methods are available (e.g., [5]–[12]) that 
can assist  system security engineers (SSEs) in identi-
fying risks in a particular environment. In addition to 
risk, the SSE must also consider other criteria when 
making mitigation decisions. Deciding upon, 
weighting, and quantifying such criteria is a challenge. 
These decisions are complex, inexact, and involve 
multiple stakeholders with diverse interests. Moreo-
ver, there is no “one size fits all” approach because, for 
example, information environments, business depend-
ence on those environments, relevant cyber threats, 
risk tolerance levels, and security budgets vary from 
one organization to the next [13]. 
The SSE faces an additional challenge when consider-
ing mitigation options: deciding upon those that best 
balance often-competing criteria (e.g., mitigation cost 
vs. trustworthiness vs. effectiveness). Such mitigation 
combinations are often discussed in the context of “Pa-
reto-efficient” solutions. Pareto efficiency is “a state 
of allocation of resources [e.g., defensive cyber solu-
tions that mitigate threats in this context] from which 
it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one in-
dividual or preference criterion better off without mak-
ing at least one individual or preference criterion 
worse off” [14].  
The contribution of this paper is an approach to miti-
gation selection containing elements of multi-criteria 
decision-making [15] that recommends a candidate set 
of defensive solutions using criteria and associated 
weightings set by the SSE. Primary initial goals are 
three-fold: (1) identify an approach that we would find 
useful as practitioners of cybersecurity risk and miti-
gation analysis, (2) ensure that the approach is com-
patible with cybersecurity threats and mitigations 
modeled as capabilities, and (3) identify a practical 
middle ground between completely ad hoc mitigation 
selection approaches on the one hand, and approaches 
whose computational complexity requires the use of 
sophisticated heuristic algorithms on the other.  
The paper is organized as follows: after reviewing re-
lated work, we summarize the capability-based repre-
sentation for cyber threats and defenses against those 
threats. Next, we use Design Science principles to de-
scribe and analyze the artifacts that make up our ap-
proach. The description includes a discussion of the 
underlying object model, associated methods, and an 
instantiation of the model and methods. Lastly, we 
evaluate the artifacts with a focus on execution perfor-
mance for the instantiation, discuss results, and con-
clude with lessons learned and ideas for future work. 
2. Related Work 
In practice, it is unrealistic to apply all possible miti-
gations (also sometimes called security controls) to 
every threat, due to budget and time pressures, feasi-
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bility, and other organizational concerns. Several re-
searchers have approached the problem of optimizing 
mitigation selections, that is, taking a longer list of 
possible mitigations and down-selecting to a shorter 
list based on some defined criteria or goals. There are 
two interesting dimensions to this area, the criteria 
themselves and the analysis methods. 
Dor and Elovici [16] describe a model of information 
security investment decision-making comprised of 
concepts that they derive from a grounded theory 
study. The authors identify great differences in the 
ways organizations make these decisions influenced 
by a multitude of criteria, including policy, competi-
tive advantage, financial considerations, quality, com-
pliance, customer expectations, and strategy. 
A review of the literature confirms the wide variety of 
criteria considered when selecting a security control 
portfolio for a particular situation, including overarch-
ing organizational concerns, attributes of specific as-
sets in the environment, anticipated threats, and prop-
erties of controls. We summarize these criteria below: 
Organizational 
 Business impact/disruption, anticipated loss, 
profit reduction, fines, reputation, decline in 
stock price, damage [17]–[23] 
 Risk tolerance [12], [19], [24]; Budget [19] 
 Legal and regulatory [22] 
 Self-imposed constraints [22] 
Asset  
 Importance/value [13], [24]–[27] 
 Assessed risk [12], [24] 
 Probability of breach, event, or successful at-
tack [13], [24], [26], [28], [29] 
Threat 
 Anticipated [25], [27], [30], [31] 
 Most significant [25] 
 Residual risk [23], [32]; Incident data [17] 
Control 
 Cost, general [12], [13], [30], [32], [18], 
[20]–[23], [26]–[28] 
 Purchase/setup [17], [24], [25], [33]–[35] 
 Number of controls as a proxy for cost [36] 
 Difficulty of implementation [25] 
 Operation, training, and maintenance cost 
[17], [24], [25], [33], [35] 
 Efficiency, effectiveness, performance, de-
gree or number of threats addressed [12], 
[17], [20], [25], [28], [33], [34] 
 Degree of implementation [30] 
 Alignment with applicable standards, laws, 
regulations [33], [34] 
 Availability [12] 
 Number of benefits accessed [37] 
 Controls which, when applied in combina-
tion, provide more benefit than the sum of 
their individual benefits [37] 
 Stakeholder preference [31] 
Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) [15], also 
known as multiple-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), 
is widely applied to security portfolio selection [12], 
[19], [22], [24], [28], [29], [36], [38]. MCDM is a dis-
cipline for evaluating multiple conflicting criteria. It is 
used to analyze problems where there are some 
measures of costs and benefits that can be traded off to 
arrive at the best solution under the given constraints. 
Researchers investigate a number of MCDM tech-
niques for this problem, some of which include or are 
based on fuzzy set theory [34], multi-attribute utility 
theory (i.e., value functions, knapsack strategy) [18], 
[27], [30], [37], evolutionary multi-objective optimi-
zation (EMO) also known as genetic algorithms [13], 
[20], [23], [26], [32], [35], analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP) [31], grey relational analysis (GRA) [25], sim-
ple additive weighting (SAW) [17], the technique for 
order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOP-
SIS) [25], and preference ranking organization method 
for enrichment evaluation (PROMETHEE) [33]. 
Several authors apply game theory to security portfo-
lio selection in combination with MCDM techniques. 
Fielder et al. [30] employs a pure game theoretic ap-
proach in a single massive two-person non-coopera-
tive zero-sum static game where the defender (person 
in charge of choosing defenses) competes against an 
attacker who chooses among various attack targets. 
The Nash equilibrium of the game represents the best 
defensive portfolio. Recognizing that the organization 
may not have sufficient budget to implement the equi-
librium of the pure game, the authors also discuss a 
hybrid approach combining game theory with a knap-
sack strategy. Panaousis, et al. [27] model the cyber-
security posture of an organization and then present a 
series of non-cooperative control-games where each 
game is between the defender (a single control) and 
the attacker. The Nash equilibria of the games are de-
rived in consideration of organizational preferences 
such as costs, anticipated threats, and asset im-
portance. A knapsack approach is subsequently used 
to optimize investment in security controls within the 
organization’s budget. Finally, Wang and Zhu [21] 
used evolutionary game theory to investigate long-
term cybersecurity investment strategies finding that 
firms will invest as long as either the cost to invest is 
low or the cost of a breach is high. 
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3. Capability-Based Representation 
This paper examines defensive solution selection in 
the context of a capability-based representation for 
cyber threats and mitigations to those threats 
[5][39][40]. We define a capability as the ability to 
contribute in some way to the attack or defense of a 
target system and a defensive solution as a coordinated 
set of defensive capabilities. In this approach, the fo-
cus is on (1) the underlying offensive capabilities that 
cyber attackers use to compose attacks and (2) the de-
fensive capabilities composed into defensive solutions 
that mitigate those offensive capabilities. See the Uni-
fied Modeling Language (UML) model [41] in Figure 
1 for the basic entities and relationships.  
 
Figure 1: Capability-Based Representation 
An example of an offensive capability is “Inject 
stealthy software implants” and an example of a re-
lated defensive capability is “Detect and block most 
stealthy implants via software whitelisting.”  
The capability-based approach is in contrast to the his-
torically more common attack-centric approach used 
in cybersecurity analysis that requires one to enumer-
ate and analyze attack possibilities. We find capabil-
ity-based analysis more tractable than attack and vul-
nerability enumeration [42] and justify the approach 
on the hypothesis that the more one mitigates offen-
sive capabilities possessed by the anticipated adver-
sary, the more difficult it is for the adversary to com-
pose viable attacks from remaining, unmitigated capa-
bilities. 
4. Artifacts 
This section discusses the artifacts that compose our 
approach. The artifacts include (1) a model, (2) meth-
ods that employ the model to recommend the best po-
tential defensive solutions subject to constraints, and 
(3) an experimental instantiation (1) and (2). 
We examine the artifacts in the context of Design Sci-
ence (DS) principles as articulated by Peffers, et al., in 
the paper “A Design Science Research Methodology 
for Information Systems Research” [43]. Peffers pre-
sents a series of steps for artifacts evaluation, specifi-
cally: (1) identify the problem and show its im-
portance, (2) define objectives of a solution, (3) design 
and develop the artifact, (4) demonstrate the artifact in 
a suitable context, (5) evaluate the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the artifact, and (6) communicate results. 
The introduction covered steps 1-2. This section lays 
artifact design, and we demonstrate and evaluate the 
artifacts in upcoming sections. Lastly, this paper con-
tributes to the communication requirement. 
Model. The UML model in Figure 2 builds on Figure 
1 and illustrates an object model used in our experi-
mental prototype implementation.  
 
Figure 2: UML Model 
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Brief descriptions of the classes in Figure 2 appear in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Class Descriptions 
Class Description 
Catalog 
A reusable knowledge management 
repository for capturing the infor-
mation in Figure 1. 
Environ-
ment (E) 
The asset instances and existing miti-
gations mapped to them that make up 
the target environment to be ana-
lyzed.  
Asset 
Instance 
(AI) 
An instance of an asset in the target 
cyber environment. Each asset has a 
corresponding asset type found in the 
Catalog. 
Assigned 
Mitigation 
A mapping of a defensive capability 
from the Catalog to an asset instance 
in the environment.  
AssetType 
(AT) 
The type of an asset. Offensive capa-
bilities map to the asset types they 
threaten. 
Defensive 
Solution 
(DS) 
A collection of defensive capabilities 
that together can mitigate the effects 
of one or more offensive capabilities. 
Defensive 
Capability 
(DC) 
The ability to contribute to the miti-
gation of an offensive capability. 
Fitness 
Criteria 
The set of user-selected weights for 
the fitness criteria. 
Member 
A mapping of a defensive capability 
to a given defensive solution. 
Mitigation 
The mapping of a given defensive so-
lution to an offensive capability that it 
mitigates. 
Offensive 
Capability 
(OC) 
The ability to contribute to the attack 
of an asset in some way. 
Threatens 
A mapping of an offensive capability 
to a given asset type. 
Tradespace 
Simulator 
The main program. 
 
Selection Method. This section uses the abbrevia-
tions for classes introduced above to discuss the selec-
tion method, called findBestSolutions. The method 
uses the model given in Figure 2 and an accessory fit-
ness function that scores criteria introduced below.   
Evaluation Criteria. To evaluate the fitness of DSs 
for their role in potentially mitigating OCs, the method 
employs a set of evaluation criteria shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Defensive Solution Evaluation Criteria 
Crite-
rion 
Description Max 
Map-
ping 
Severity 
The severity of an offen-
sive capability. Severity 
could be derived, for ex-
ample, from CVSS 
scores stored in the Na-
tional Vulnerability Da-
tabase [44]. 
 OC 
Effec-
tiveness 
How effective a DS is 
believed to be. A value 
of 0.0 means fully inef-
fective; 1.0 means fully 
effective. 
 
DS to 
OC 
map-
ping 
Assur-
ance 
How trustworthy a 
given DS is believed to 
be. A DS might be con-
sidered more trustwor-
thy, for example, if it 
has been rigorously 
tested by an independent 
testing laboratory [45]. 
 DS 
Cost 
An estimate of the total 
cost of the DS. Cost in-
cludes multiple compo-
nents, such as cost to ac-
quire, integrate, operate, 
and train users, as appli-
cable. 
-- DS 
Time 
Estimated time to inte-
grate the DS. 
-- DS 
Impact 
Impact to mission/busi-
ness performance from 
use of the DS. 
-- DS 
Reuse 
How much of a given 
DS is already imple-
mented in the environ-
ment for a given asset. 
 
DS 
mapped 
to AI in 
E 
Ap-
plicabil-
ity 
The ratio of the number 
of offensive capabilities 
mapped to asset in-
stances in the target en-
vironment that the DS 
can mitigate to the high-
est number of any DS 
mapped. 
 
DS 
mapped 
to E 
Consistent with MCDM, we normalize the range of 
each criterion to values between 0.0 and 1.0 inclusive. 
Some criteria, such as cost, time, and reuse, use an or-
dinal Likert scale mapped to this range. At least ini-
tially, subject matter experts (SMEs) set the values for 
the first six criteria. The findBestSolutions method 
computes the last two criteria based on E. The long-
Page 7325
    
term goal is to calibrate SME-determined values with 
empirical reality as such data becomes available.  
The Max column in Table 2 indicates whether we wish 
to maximize (checkmark present) or minimize 
(checkmark absent) the corresponding criterion. For 
example, we wish to maximize use of defensive solu-
tions that more effectively address more severe offen-
sive capabilities, whereas we wish to minimize cost, 
time, and mission impact. The Mapping column in Ta-
ble 2 indicates the mapping of a criterion into the 
model in Figure 2. For example, severity is with re-
spect to the effects of an offensive capability (OC) and 
effectiveness is with respect to the mapping of a de-
fensive solution (DS) to an offensive capability (OC). 
We selected the criteria in Table 2 based on a review 
of the literature and on requirements that stakeholders 
commonly articulate in our experience. Note that the 
risk score for each asset in the target environment is 
not included as a criterion in Table 2 because we use 
the risk score to filter or down-select the asset in-
stances in the target environment for consideration of 
mitigations in the first place. That is, the findBestSo-
lutions method only considers the ‘riskiest’ assets 
based on a SSE-supplied level of risk tolerance. 
Fitness Function. The fitness function, ff, computes a 
fitness score over the criteria from Table 2 and imple-
ments equation (1).  
𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠) =  
∑  |𝑚𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠)|  ∙  𝑓𝑤𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1    (1)  
Elements of equation (1) are as follows: 
 𝑓𝑓 returns a fitness score for a given defensive so-
lution, ds, mapped to a particular offensive capa-
bility, oc that, in turn, is mapped to a particular 
asset instance, ai, in the target environment under 
consideration. ai maps to a particular AT.  
 𝑛 is the number of criteria, 8 in this case. 
 𝑓𝑖(𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠) is the value of the ith criterion in the 
context of ai, oc, and ds; 0.0 ≤ value ≤ 1.0. 
 𝑓𝑤𝑖  is the weight for the given criterion. The SSE 
assigns a weight based on relative importance of 
the criterion in the context of the target environ-
ment. Criterion weights are relative to one another 
and must be non-negative (𝑓𝑤𝑖 𝜖 ℤ
≥).  
 𝑚𝑓𝑖  follows the Max column in Table 2. If the 
goal is to maximize the given criterion, then 𝑚𝑓𝑖  
is set to 0.0; otherwise, 𝑚𝑓𝑖  is set to 1.0.  
findBestSolutions. findBestSolutions is an imple-
mentation of equation (2) and finds the ‘best’ solutions 
for the given criteria and associated weightings. 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝐴𝐼𝑒 , 𝑂𝐶, 𝐷𝑆) = 
⋁ ⋁ ⋁ 𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑖, 𝑜𝑐, 𝑑𝑠)
 𝑑𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑆𝑜𝑐  𝑜𝑐 ∈ 𝑂𝐶𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝑎𝑖) 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝐼𝑒
 
(2) 
Equation (2) considers each asset instance, ai, in the 
set of assets instances, AI, in the target environment, 
e. For each ai, it considers each offensive capability 
from the set of offensive capabilities, OC, mapped to 
the asset type, AT, corresponding to the ai. Then for 
each defensive solution mapped to oc, it applies the 
fitness function, ff, from equation (1) to ds (in the con-
text of oc and ai).  
Instantiation. We call our instantiation of the model 
and methods described above TradespaceSimulator. 
To allow us to assess performance, the simulator gen-
erates a synthetic sample catalog and a sample target 
environment using a configurable set of size parame-
ters. Example output from the simulator appears in 
Figures 3, 4, and 5. Figure 3 is sample output from the 
findBestSolutions method.  
 
Figure 3: Sample output from findBestSolutions 
In the Figure 3 sample, the output is for asset instance, 
AI0, which is of type AT3. The offensive capability 
threat under consideration is OC4, which has a sever-
ity of 0.6. OC4 has seven candidate defensive solu-
tions, each with a fitness score computed by ff. For ex-
ample, defensive solution DS36 has fitness score of 
5.67, which is the sum of the weighted criterion values 
given in column 5 of Table 3.  
Table 3: DS36 score derivation 
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Figure 4 shows a small sampling of the best solutions 
resulting from application of the findBestSolutions 
method and the asset instances to which they apply.  
 
Figure 4: ‘Best’ solutions mapped to asset instances  
This output provides information for the SSE to con-
sider when making mitigation decisions. To simplify 
the output, the method does not show the offensive ca-
pabilities mitigated by each defensive solution (this in-
formation appears elsewhere, such as in Figure 3). 
Note that the method computes fitness for all defen-
sive solutions mapped to a given threat/asset instance 
combination, but retains only the highest scoring de-
fensive solution.  The collection of highest scoring so-
lutions is then the recommended architecture.  
To go along with the output in Figure 4, the simulator 
performs additional bookkeeping during execution of 
findBestSolutions to allow it to later provide an ‘ag-
gregate’ view of each defensive solution, a sampling 
of which appears in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Aggregate Score View 
For example, the fifth line of the sample output in Fig-
ure 5 shows that defensive solution DS62 has an ag-
gregate score of 265.4, which is the sum of the solu-
tion’s fitness scores for all the places that it applies in 
E, which is 32 unique combinations of asset instances 
and offensive capabilities. The output also shows that 
DS62 was the ‘best’ solution in 30 of those cases, giv-
ing it an overall ‘best’ percentage of 93.8%. If we scale 
the aggregate score of 265.4 by this percentage, the ad-
justed aggregate score is 248.8. 
In combination, figures 4 and 5 provide a local and 
global view, allowing the SSE to see defensive solu-
tions asset-by-asset, threat-by-threat, but also the over-
all value of defensive solutions as they pertain to the 
target environment as a whole. 
5. Evaluation and Discussion 
This section evaluates the artifacts introduced above.  
Model. While the object model is suitable for repre-
senting the problem space of interest in this paper, one 
could enhance the model for broader use, e.g., organ-
izing asset types into a taxonomy to better represent 
and organize asset type possibilities and expanding the 
model to include named asset groupings. 
Methods. The fitness function, ff, and findBestSolu-
tions method artifacts together select the ‘best’ solu-
tion based on a given set of weighted criteria. The au-
thors chose to relate the criteria in a linear combination 
instead of arranging criteria into a more general poly-
nomial equation, as a linear combination produced re-
sults that we considered to be useful for informing de-
cisions. However, the SSE is free to assign weights 
along a non-linear scale, if desired.  
While the set of criteria chosen in this approach has 
utility to the authors, we recognize that obtaining val-
ues for certain criteria can be a challenge. The use of 
ordinal scale data that SMEs assign based on their gen-
eral knowledge partially ameliorates this problem, but 
ultimately, we would like to introduce, for example, 
actual cost estimates for the cost attributes associated 
with defensive capabilities and solutions. 
The findBestSolutions method proceeds asset instance 
by asset instance, considering offensive capabilities 
that each instance faces. The method includes a more 
global view as well by computing the applicability cri-
terion value. In addition, and as discussed in the In-
stantiation section above, the simulator sums up fit-
ness scores for each applicable offensive solution 
score from the catalog and scales the result based on 
the percentage of time the solution had the best score.  
Instantiation. We were interested in performance 
characteristics of the Java-based instantiation under 
increasing sizes of catalog and target environment.  
Table 4: Variables in Sample Output 
Variable Description 
Trial Trial number (1 to 15) 
Sec Time to generate solutions in seconds 
E-AI Environment: asset instances 
E-Mit Environment: existing mitigations 
C-OC Catalog: offensive capabilities 
C-DS Catalog: defensive solutions 
C-DC Catalog: defensive capabilities 
C-AT Catalog: asset types 
C-Mit Catalog: mapped mitigations 
C-Mem Catalog: solution members (a member is a 
defensive capability) 
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With this in mind, we ran 15 trials on a Windows 10 
Dell Latitude E5570 laptop with 15 GB of memory 
and an Intel Core i7-6820 processor. Table 4 describes 
the variables of interest in a run of the simulator. Table 
5 shows the values of each of the variables tracked for 
each trial execution. Each successive trial used a larger 
total generated data set for both the Environment (E-
prefixed variables) and Catalog (C-prefixed varia-
bles). For example, trial 2 had an environment consist-
ing of 70 asset instances and 208 mitigations. 
Table 5: Trials and associated data per trial 
 
The second column shows the total time in seconds 
that the findBestSolutions method took to run, which 
includes calls to the ff method.  
As Figure 6 shows, time increases nearly linearly for 
the catalog and environment sizes that we sampled. 
We expect non-linear performance in the long run (for 
very large catalogs and target environments for analy-
sis) based on the three nested loops of the implemen-
tation of equation (2). That said, the catalog and envi-
ronment sizes in trial #15 are larger than any catalog 
or target environment we have ever evaluated in our 
work to date assessing real-world systems. 
 
Figure 6: Execution time in seconds per run 
The overall approach has certain limitations. For ex-
ample, one cannot specify “do not exceed” values 
(e.g., a given budget) or “do not fall below” (e.g., a 
given level of trustworthiness) values for selected cri-
terion. Other limitations are: the approach does not 
take into consideration the uncertainty of values for 
criteria and the approach offers no special assistance 
for conducting sensitivity analysis beyond manual re-
executions that use revised weightings. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
We used Design Science principles in our conception 
and evaluation of an approach to mitigation selection 
based on a capability representation for offensive and 
defensive abilities possessed by attackers and defend-
ers, respectively. The approach uses a set of weighted 
criteria that are customizable by the SSE based on or-
ganizational priorities and constraints. We learned that 
the approach yielded acceptable performance results 
for the size of target environments that we commonly 
see. We also found that we could readily generalize the 
results to a more global view, specifically a defensive 
solution’s overall contribution to a target environment.  
Future work possibilities include: (1) consider poten-
tially augmenting the approach with more sophisti-
cated methods (e.g., genetic algorithms, linear pro-
gramming) that can help with the first limitation listed 
earlier; (2) formally assess the utility of the artifacts to 
working SSEs, including a survey of SSEs about the 
solution selection criteria they think are, on average, 
the most useful and how they would set default 
weights for those criteria; (3) explore ways to incorpo-
rate uncertainty and sensitivity analysis into the ap-
proach; (4) apply the artifacts to non-synthetic data 
sets; (5) compare SSE-selected mitigations to that of 
the simulator for the same target system and investi-
gate to understand the differences in outcomes; (6) in-
corporate additional criteria, such as the ability to pre-
fer or avoid certain vendor implementations of given 
defensive solutions/capabilities and criteria described 
in the related work section, such as favoring solutions 
that align to certain standards; and (7) break out the 
cost criteria into explicit sub-criteria so they can be re-
ceive separate weights.  
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